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ABSTRACT 
Users of social networking sites often want to manage the sharing 
of information and content with different groups of people based 
on their differing relationships.  However, grouping contacts 
places a significant configuration burden on the user.  Automated 
approaches to grouping may have the potential to reduce this 
burden, however, their use remains largely untested.  We 
investigate people’s rationales when grouping their contacts for 
the purpose of controlling their privacy, finding six criteria that 
they commonly considered.  We assess an automated approach to 
grouping, based on a network clustering algorithm, whose 
performance may be analogous to the human’s use of some of 
these criteria.  We find that the similarity between the groups 
created by people and those created by the algorithm is correlated 
with the modularity of their network.  We also demonstrate that 
the particular clustering algorithm, SCAN, which detects hubs and 
outliers within a network can be beneficial for identifying contacts 
who are hard to group or for whom privacy preferences are 
inconsistent with the rest of their group. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H5.3. Group and Organization Interfaces; Asynchronous 
interaction; Web-based interaction. 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Design, Human Factors. 
Keywords 
Social networks, social media, privacy, content sharing, group-
based access control, network structure, tie strength, automation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Social network sites (SNS) allow their users to disseminate 
information and digital content across social networks.  However, 
these services typically treat all of a user’s contacts equally, 
enforcing a monolithic notion of ‘friendship’ and ignoring the 
complexity and diversity of real world relations and the different 
roles they play.  The varying nature of these relationships has 
implications for privacy in particular.  Users may feel that they are 
compromising their privacy if they do not have the ability to allow 
different people varying degrees of access to their information.  
Specifying unique privacy settings for each individual within a 
user’s social network provides the greatest level of control, 
however, it is common for a user to have hundreds of contacts.  
This makes it infeasible to accurately configure individual privacy 
settings every time one chooses to share a piece of content.  Some 
social media sharing services address the need for granular privacy 
controls by allowing users to compartmentalize their social 
network, grouping contacts with whom they might share 
information similarly.  The goal is to reduce the overhead of 
privacy management by reducing the granularity of disclosure 
decisions from individuals to groups.  Managing groups may itself 
present a configuration burden, although Lederer et al. [16] 
suggest that good design practices can lessen this burden. 
The contribution of this paper is threefold: it (1) identifies what 
information humans use when they conceptually group ‘friends’ 
for privacy purposes; (2) tests an existing network analysis 
algorithm to see how well it can accomplish this grouping and 
lessen the burden on the user; and (3) examines whether 
automated grouping is a viable approach to privacy management, 
given that personal privacy policies may vary depending on 
numerous factors such as the current context, need and activity.  
These contributions are timely as many users of social network 
sites are obliged to deal with complex privacy management 
decisions resulting from the integration of multiple social groups 
inherent in the expansion of such sites.   
Contribution (1) is described in Section 3, which reports our 
collection and analysis of a dataset of 15 egocentric Facebook 
networks (i.e. networks centered on a single user), with a 
combined total of 3000 contacts and over 15,000 links.  We used a 
card-sorting and interview study to identify the factors that people 
considered when creating groups with which to classify their 
contacts for the purpose of controlling privacy.  Contribution (2) is 
described in Section 4, in which we investigate whether an 
approach to automating the creation of such groups using network 
clustering can take account of factors commonly considered by 
humans when grouping, and examine how closely algorithmic and 
human groupings match.  Contribution (3) is described in Section 
5, in which we report a questionnaire study of our participants’ 
willingness to share items of their personal content with 
individuals within their network, and examine how well their 
preferences correlate with the groups created in Section 4. 
In Section 6 we discuss our findings and make recommendations 
for how we might design systems that assist users in grouping 
contacts for content sharing and that support privacy-sensitive 
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disclosures in social networks where multiple social groups co-
exist.  
2. RELATED WORK 
The networks of ‘Friends’ which users maintain on SNSs often 
consist of contacts associated with distinct facets of their lives.  
Sites such as Facebook initially tailored content and user 
experience to a certain demographic, but now generate broader 
appeal and support users in maintaining diverse social 
relationships that span different aspects of their lives [6].  Users 
are expected to manage multiple social group memberships 
through a single system, which makes controlling privacy and 
online identity an interesting new challenge.  Presenting 
information uniformly across connections from these various 
groups can be problematic, particularly for users who are privacy 
conscious.  Goffman [9] observed that people attempt to maintain 
a great deal of control over their personas and minimize the 
appearance of characteristics that are contrary to an idealized 
version of themselves.  Hewitt and Forte [11] suggest that SNSs, 
in which distinct social groups are co-present, challenge our 
ability to exercise such control and that a perceived loss of such 
control is part of many users’ experience on SNSs. 
Skeels and Grudin [19] define group co-presence as “a situation in 
which many groups important to an individual are simultaneously 
present in one context and their presence is salient for the 
individual”.  They found that as people tried to manage the co-
presence of multiple groups within their network, they adjusted 
their posts to make them suitable for a broader audience but were 
often unhappy with this as a solution.  Lampinen [14] asserts that 
limiting personal disclosures according to the “lowest common 
denominator” or resorting to other defensive strategies of social 
identity and privacy protection is a problem that merits attention 
from SNS researchers and designers.  His study revealed that even 
the most carefree SNS users had attempted to manage group co-
presence even when it was not explicitly supported by the system.  
This required dividing the platform into separate spaces, 
performing self-censorship and using suitable channels of 
communication, establishing and continually managing group 
identities to facilitate more contextual sharing, or relying on the 
goodwill and discretion of other users.  
Several studies have demonstrated users’ desire to create groups 
of contacts that act as a mechanism for multi-level access control 
when sharing content, reducing the burden of employing such 
strategies [6][19].  boyd [2] found that in addition to SNS users 
being concerned about whether a particular piece of information or 
content would be suitable for a particular audience, they are also 
concerned with contacts from distinct contexts or groups being 
able to reach out and interact with one another.  Group-based 
access control could offer a solution that prevents the inadvertent 
flow of information between groups within a user’s network. 
Lederer et al. [15] found that people base decisions about sharing 
information more on the identity of the recipient than on the 
situation within which the information was sought.  Similarly, 
Davis et al. [5] established that people decide with whom to share 
information based on the type of relationship (e.g. spouse, friend, 
peer etc).  Jones et al. [13] and Olson et al. [18] showed that 
people want to specify groups and basic categories centered on 
these relationships, for which they can specify an appropriate 
privacy setting.  However, it has also been noted [16] that 
managing groups can be a significant burden for the user, 
particularly as the number of contacts and relationship types 
expands with the growth and popularity of the service.  In 
addition, Ackerman & Mainwaring [1] stress that, although 
valued, privacy is not the users’ primary task and that making it an 
explicit task for the user can be problematic.  Designing systems 
that reduce privacy violations without significant configuration 
effort from the user is therefore an important objective. 
Researchers have suggested using automated algorithms that 
use information such as network measures or tie strength 
to automatically determine distinct groups within a social network, 
however we have not found any work which builds and tests such 
an algorithm in order to analyze how well it performs.  Gilbert and 
Karahalios [8] suggest that privacy controls based on tie strength 
may help to segment a user’s social network into meaningful 
groups.  For example, a system could decide which contacts fall 
into trusted and untrusted categories and restrict content 
accordingly.  In order to distinguish between strong and weak ties, 
Gilbert and Karahalios examined activity networks in Facebook, 
i.e. interactions between members of a social network rather than 
merely ‘Friend’ connections.  They showed that tie strength may 
be modeled with high accuracy based on these interactions.   
Other work has proposed that network measures might reasonably 
detect distinct groups within a social network.  There has been 
considerable research into partitioning networks into such clusters 
by algorithmic analysis of the network structure [e.g. 4, 21].  Most 
of these algorithms cluster vertices within the social network such 
that there is a dense set of many ties within each cluster and few 
ties between clusters.  A network with this property is said to be 
highly modular.  Widely used modularity-based clustering 
algorithms, such as the CNM algorithm [4], cluster vertices in the 
network such that modularity is maximized.   
In a study by McCarty [17], network clustering generated clusters 
that were subsequently verified as meaningful by their respective 
network owners.  McCarty suggests that the reason for participants 
being able to recognize clusters as meaningful groups is that 
“frequently members of one group do not know members of 
another.  For example, it is not uncommon for there to be no 
network ties between family and co-workers”; i.e. there is a dense 
set of ties within a group and few ties between groups.  We 
speculate that such clustering might reasonably predict groups that 
users wish to create for controlling their privacy within a social 
network, separating groups representing distinct contexts and 
relationship types from one another. 
Although many contextual factors can affect privacy decisions, the 
findings from Lederer [15] suggest that the primary index for such 
decisions should be the identity of the recipient.  The precise 
context surrounding the disclosure is secondary to this and has less 
influence on the overall decision.  Standard network clustering 
algorithms are oblivious to such context and operate only on the 
structure of the network, i.e. the individuals in the network and 
their links.  Thus, algorithmic network clustering may provide a 
suitable starting point or set of defaults to reflect the primary index 
in grouping potential recipients of shared information, provided 
that allowance is made for adjustment of these defaults as 
required. 
Although we share with some related work a goal of developing 
approaches for the automated detection of co-present groups 
within social networks, we begin by trying to understand how 
people manually group contacts for the purpose of controlling 
privacy.  This understanding can then be used to inform an 
automated approach to assisting such grouping. 
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3. EXAMINING GROUP-BASED PRIVACY 
The first part of this study had three goals: to understand how 
group-based privacy controls in a widely used social networking 
service are currently being used; to understand the factors that 
influence how people group their contacts; and to build a dataset 
of privacy-based groups, created by participants, against which we 
could compare the output of automated approaches to grouping. 
Participants were recruited through university mailing lists within 
several departments, and messages advertising the study on a 
Facebook page used to recruit participants for academic studies.  
Participants were offered entry into a prize draw for a £25 book 
voucher as an incentive. 
We had 15 participants in total, all of which were Facebook users, 
8 male and 7 female, mean age 27 with a range from 19 to 43 
years.  6 of the participants were university students and the 
remaining 9 were in full-time employment.  All participants stated 
that they logged into Facebook at least once a day and had used it 
to share personal content and information.  Our participants had a 
mean of 200 Facebook ‘Friends’ (SD=61.4), with a range from 99 
to 312.  Our study involved data collection using a custom 
Facebook application, a card sorting exercise, an interview and an 
online questionnaire.  Our application required no more access to 
personal information than any other Facebook application and 
complied with the regulations set by Facebook.  The following 
sections describe each stage of the data collection in more detail. 
3.1 Facebook Data Collection 
Each participant began by using our application to retrieve the set 
of all her Friend connections.  These undirected links (Figure 1a) 
grant users access to each other’s profile and shared content.  
Restrictions can be applied to these connections by placing a 
Friend into a particular group (referred to as ‘lists’ in Facebook) 
for which permissions have been configured.  Facebook attempted 
to provide automatic grouping of Friends into lists using data from 
the optional “How do you know this person?” field and from 
information about which institutions users indicated they belong to 
(although this feature is now deprecated in the current version).  
We also retrieved the names of the lists that each user had within 
her account and the contacts contained within them in order to 
question participants about their usefulness and whether they had 
relied on the automatic grouping by Facebook or manually 
adjusted these groups themselves. 
 
Figure 1a.  Direct ‘Friend’ Ties   1b. Friend-to-Friend Ties 
We also used our Facebook application to retrieve a list of all 
connections amongst a participant’s Friends (Figure 1b), 
effectively telling us who knows whom within the user’s 
immediate social network.  We used these data to build a graph of 
the social network of the user’s Friends on which we could run a 
network-clustering algorithm in an attempt to identify distinct 
groups, based solely on the structure of the network in terms of 
edges and vertices. 
3.2 Card Sorting Task and Interviews 
In order to investigate how users segment their social network into 
groups we carried out a manual grouping exercise.  Using xSort1, a 
card sorting software application, participants were asked to sort 
cards representing their Friends, as if they were grouping them for 
controlling their privacy on Facebook.  They were encouraged to 
think about with whom they would share information similarly 
and create groups such that they could be used to grant or deny 
access to information or content within their Facebook account.  
Friends’ names were imported to the card sorting application from 
the data collected on Facebook.  The card sort was ‘open’, 
allowing participants to create an unlimited number of groups, sort 
according to any criteria they deemed suitable and describe each 
group with an appropriate label. 
Upon completion of the card sorting exercise, participants were 
interviewed, with each interview session lasting roughly 30 
minutes.  Approximately 15 minutes was allocated to discussing 
current practices when sharing content and their use of the group-
based privacy controls provided in that version of Facebook.  The 
other 15 minutes was allocated to discussing the rationale behind 
the groups that the participant had created in the card sorting 
exercise.  The first part of the interview was semi-structured with 
participants answering questions such as: “Who do you share 
content with on Facebook?”; “How do you decide what to share 
and what not to share on Facebook?”; “Have you ever regretted 
sharing anything with anybody?”.  Participants were prompted to 
discuss in depth any interesting points relating to controlling the 
disclosure of content and the distinction between groups and 
individuals in their network.  In the second part of the interview 
the participants were instructed to talk about each of the groups 
that they had created in turn.  They were asked to explain the label 
given to the group, the criteria that group members conform to in 
order to qualify as a member of the group and the rationale for 
creating the group.  They were also asked whether they had 
difficulty grouping any particular contacts and to identify these 
contacts. 
Data collected during the interviews were validated through 
member checking.  Notes taken by the interviewer during the 
interview were summarized and shared with the participant in 
order for them to affirm that their explanations were completely 
and accurately reflected.  Interviews were recorded, transcribed 
and coded using a grounded-theory analysis where emergent 
themes were iteratively refined.  An emphasis was placed on what 
emerged from the data, rather than using a hypothesis-driven 
approach for analysis. 
3.3 Interview and Card Sort Results 
3.3.1 Current Use of Group-Based Privacy  
The following section describes the findings from the first part of 
our interview in which we questioned users about their use of 
group-based privacy controls for sharing content on Facebook. 
                                                
1 www.xsortapp.com 
(a) (b) 
 The majority of our participants, despite being seasoned Facebook 
users, were unaware that the group-based privacy control features 
even existed.  Of those who were aware, only two had taken the 
time to manually organize their contacts into groups.   
Both of these users had done so only when the instant messaging 
service integrated into Facebook began to utilize the groups.  
“Although I knew it would be useful to have people grouped for 
the purposes of controlling access to my content, I was only really 
motivated to do it when it became a part of the chat list too.  It was 
messy having all of my contacts in one long list, so I grouped 
them then”.  Thus, controlling privacy was not enough motivation 
to group contacts but when other features started to utilize the 
groups, e.g. organizing the chat list, sending messages to whole 
groups, filtering content received from groups, users were more 
motivated to create them. 
The overwhelming consensus amongst our participants was that 
the task of organizing contacts into groups required too much time 
and effort to be worthwhile.  The mean time to complete the card 
sort was 27 minutes.  All participants stated that they would not 
spend that much time configuring the groups for their Facebook 
account, especially as they felt that they are impeded by the 
interface for doing so to a greater extent than with our card sorting 
application.  One participant supported Lederer et al.’s [16] claim 
that good design practices, such as allowing contacts to be 
bootstrapped into groups as they are added, might reduce the 
configuration burden: “I think if [a grouping mechanism] was 
there when you added contacts and it was easy to do then I’d use 
it, but I don’t think I could be bothered to go through all my 
contacts now to group them.” 
A previous version of Facebook attempted to automatically create 
groups and organize contacts into them, relying on information 
explicitly provided about the nature of the relationship or the 
organization to which a person belongs, resulting in groups such 
as “Family”, “Work”, “Grad School”, “High School” and 
“Elementary School”.  We found that on average only 20% of 
Friends were placed into the groups by Facebook and that none of 
our participants had used these groups to restrict access to 
particular content.  They typically regarded them as “too 
incomplete to be useful”.  None of our participants had attempted 
to finish populating the groups automatically created by Facebook, 
other than a group called ‘Limited Profile’.  This group has highly 
restrictive privacy settings by default and acts as an easy way for 
users to segregate contacts to whom they wish to give very limited 
access to their information.   
3.3.2 Card Sort Results 
Table 1 shows a summary of the data collected from the card 
sorting exercise.  All participants completed the exercise, creating 
a mean of 12.9 groups (SD=4.93).  The mean group size was 16.7 
contacts (SD=5.26).  The table also gives some examples of the 
Table 1. Card Sorting Results 
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labels given to these groups by participants.  Although these labels 
give an overview of the card sort, in many cases they do not reveal 
details about how or why the group was created.  We were careful 
to avoid relying on our own interpretation of these labels when 
attempting to identify the criteria that participants had considered 
when forming groups.  Participants gave a description of the 
considerations they had made for each group, which were 
recorded by the interviewer and subsequently validated by the 
participant to ensure accuracy.  
The following section describes the commonly considered criteria, 
which were uncovered from the card sorting exercise and 
interview sessions.  These were exposed by first open-coding the 
interview data and developing initial categories that were 
iteratively refined in order for core criteria to emerge. 
3.4 Grouping Criteria Used in the Card Sort 
Our analysis of the interviews with the participants about how 
they had performed the card sorting to group their contacts as they 
would for controlling privacy revealed the following 6 commonly 
considered criteria: 
 Social Circles & Cliques 
 Tie Strength 
 Temporal Episodes 
 Geographical Locations 
 Functional Roles 
 Organizational Boundaries 
3.4.1 Social Circles & Cliques 
Almost all (13/15) participants considered the cliques and social 
circles within their network when grouping contacts.  Social 
circles and cliques refer to tightly knit groups, e.g. a group of 
friends that are highly connected to one another. 
Large groups formed by the participants were often subdivided by 
them in order to separate distinct social circles: “Two of the 
groups that I’ve created contain my university friends, but I’ve 
divided the two separate friendship groups that I belong to.  The 
personalities of people in each of the groups are quite different and 
I think I probably behave a little differently towards each group, 
even though I consider myself just as close to the people in both of 
them”.  This participant sometimes shared content and information 
differently with each of the groups in order to comply with the 
“expectations” of each group.  “With one group I tend to joke 
around more often, with the other group I think I’m a bit more 
sensible”.  Users are not only aware of social circles and cliques 
within their wider social network but are influenced by them in 
their information and content sharing choices, with an inclination 
not to share information or content – or indeed behavior – that 
does not conform to the social norms or values of a particular 
social circle. 
The tight-knit nature of social circles and the ease with which 
information could be disseminated amongst its members also 
contributed to participants’ reasons for grouping them together: 
“The likelihood is that if I reveal something to one person in this 
group then the other people would find out about it from them 
anyway.  I would either restrict something from all of them or 
none of them”. 
3.4.2 Tie Strength 
Eleven participants considered factors relating to their relationship 
with a contact, such as the closeness, emotional intensity, level of 
trust and frequency of communication, when assigning them to a 
group.  These factors can be taken as indicators of the strength of 
an interpersonal tie [10].  
It was common for participants to create groups of ‘Close friends’ 
or ‘Best friends’.  These were either distinct groups or were sub-
groups within a larger group.  For example, participants either 
created a group based on strong ties, disregarding other factors, or 
they divided a group formed using other factors to produce two 
sub-groups, populated by strong ties and weaker ties respectively.  
One participant justified her reason for grouping strong ties thus: 
“Even though [Facebook] classes contacts as ‘Friends’, they’re not 
actually all my friends.  Sometimes they’re just people that I 
know, perhaps not even very well at all.  I don’t want them 
knowing everything about me.  But it’s different for close friends.  
I’d be willing to share far more with them”. 
It was also common for participants to create groups exclusively 
containing weak ties, such as ‘People I hardly know’, 
‘Acquaintances’, ‘Friends of friends’ and ‘People that randomly 
added me’.  Although the labels given to some of these groups did 
not always explicitly suggest tie strength, the reasoning behind the 
group’s creation was to group people with whom they had weak 
ties.  For example, one participant had some contacts who had 
been “randomly added” to her set of Friends but who subsequently 
became strong ties.  They were not grouped with the majority of 
“randomly added” contacts, because this latter group was only for 
weak ties. 
One participant told us that she had based her groups on the 
different levels of trust that she placed in people and on her 
assessment of whether people would “judge” her based on the 
content she uploaded.  “They might judge personal content in a 
negative way.  It’s not considered very cool to have lots of photos 
with your Mum and Dad, but my close friends and family enjoy 
seeing those photos.  I worry that people that I don’t know very 
well might see things like that and laugh at me”.  Others were 
more concerned about other components of interpersonal tie 
strength such as the frequency or amount of contact.  They felt that 
it would be important to share content differently with people with 
whom they did not interact a large amount or very often versus 
people with whom they interacted a lot and frequently. 
Participants isolated individuals whom they described themselves 
as being exceptionally close to, or even exceptionally cautious of, 
to be able to specify unique privacy preferences for them.  
Typically these were very close friends with whom participants 
felt they could share everything, and untrusted or disliked 
individuals with whom they wished to share very little.  Hence, 
although participants are often able to identify groups of contacts 
for privacy purposes, there is still a need to specify privacy 
settings for individuals.  Interfaces that allow group-based privacy 
control should also allow for unique settings to be applied to 
exceptional individuals. 
3.4.3 Temporal Episodes 
Six participants said that they had created groups that represented 
significant parts of their lives.  One participant referred to these as 
“episodes”, each episode representing a certain period of time.  
Into each of these groups they placed contacts that they associated 
with that episode.  Time scales ranged from hours (e.g. the time 
spent at a certain event) to months or years (e.g. the groups 
‘Summer 2009’ and ‘My Childhood’).  Temporal Episodes were 
often closely linked and sometimes conflated with Geographical 
Locations. For example, when explaining the rationale behind 
 their groups, participants would interchangeably talk about periods 
of time by referring to particular locations where that time was 
spent and vice versa. 
3.4.4 Geographical Locations 
Ten participants reported compartmentalizing their contacts into 
groups associated with particular locations, for example where 
they first met or where they spent a significant amount of time 
throughout their relationship.  Locations varied in scale from 
particular venues to entire countries.  For example, participants 
created groups such as ‘Loughborough’, for anybody they had met 
in that town.  ‘People I met on holiday in America’ was used to 
group people met in a certain country during a particular period of 
a few weeks, and ‘Met at a gig’ was used to group people met at a 
particular venue in the space of only a few hours. 
When asked why temporal episodes and geographical locations 
were important to consider for controlling privacy, users expressed 
concern about their momentary actions having unforeseen 
consequences if viewed in different contexts.  One participant told 
us, “There’s a time and a place for certain behavior.  If I share 
content such as photos, I think to myself, would I have been 
comfortable acting like this in front of people if they were actually 
there at the time?”  By compartmentalizing contacts associated 
with different times and places our participants seemed to be 
attempting to mitigate potentially negative effects of future public 
access and the loss of physical boundaries when migrating 
information about their lives to the digital domain. 
3.4.5 Functional Roles 
Although Facebook is primarily a social networking service, 
participants sometimes used it to foster non-social connections.  
Some contacts were added for professional networking and others 
were added for functional reasons, providing a particular use or 
service to the user.  For example, one participant had added as a 
contact somebody whom she had encountered through a classified 
advertisement, which she had placed on Facebook to sell an item, 
merely as a way of bookmarking him for when she wanted to 
communicate about the transaction.  Participants frequently said 
that they had asked themselves why they had added these 
‘functional’ contacts to Facebook when deciding which group to 
place them in.  They expressed concern about making personal 
information, particularly regarding their social activities, available 
to such contacts, however, they had not taken any measures to 
address such concerns. 
3.4.6 Organizational Boundaries 
Some participants grouped contacts based on the institutions or 
organizations that they belonged to, in order to be able to separate 
the professional and social aspects of their lives.  They created 
groups representing particular companies, departments and 
different roles within their workplace. 
One participant told us: “I do sometimes worry what these people 
might think when they see my profile.  Not everything on there 
portrays me in a professional light, which is how I try to represent 
myself when I’m around them in person.”  He added, “I keep 
meaning to alter my privacy preferences for these people, but I 
never get around to it”. 
3.4.7 Combinations of Factors 
When considering which group to place a particular contact in, the 
participants asked themselves questions relating to the 6 criteria, 
such as: which friendship group does this person belong to, how 
strong is our relationship, when did we meet, where did we meet, 
why did I add her as a contact, does he belong to a particular 
organization or institution.  Participants used various combinations 
of these criteria, ranging from consideration of only a single 
criterion to consideration of all 6.  In explaining their rationale for 
grouping contacts, most participants stated that they had used the 
criteria that felt most natural to them.  Some stated that it was 
easier to group participants in a certain way but that they were 
aware of other approaches to grouping.  For some participants it 
was easier to think about the strength of interpersonal ties and to 
separate trusted and untrusted contacts.  For others it was easier to 
consider only organizational boundaries or functional roles of 
contacts because they were more ‘tangible’ concepts. 
Table 2 shows the factors that were considered by each participant 
when they were organizing their contacts into groups for the card 
sort.  Only participants 8 and 13 considered precisely the same 
combination of factors.  Participants most commonly considered 
the formation of social circles and cliques within their network.  
The next most commonly considered factor was the strength of 
interpersonal tie between the participant and the contact. 
4. TESTING AUTOMATED GROUPING  
Having exposed a number of factors that people consider when 
creating groups for controlling access to their personal content and 
information, we investigated automating this grouping using a 
network analysis algorithm.  We were interested in exploring how 
closely we could match humans’ grouping of their social networks 
Table 2. Card Sorting Criteria and Strategies 
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with automated grouping, with the ultimate aim of assisting users 
in grouping contacts, thereby reducing the configuration burden of 
managing privacy and content sharing. 
Our card-sorting and interview findings suggest that a suitable 
automated approach should group contacts using criteria 
analogous to as many of the 6 identified factors as possible.  An 
additional requirement for an automated approach to grouping is 
that minimal explicit input should be required from the user 
beyond their normal interaction with the system [1].  For example 
a user should not have to provide additional information about 
each of their contacts in order to assist the automation.   
We believe that network clustering is a candidate for automated 
grouping for a number of reasons.  First, network clustering relies 
only on the network graph of connections between individuals; no 
additional information is required.  Forming these connections is a 
fundamental part of the user experience on a social network such 
as Facebook.  Hogan [12] suggests that the norms of ‘friending’ 
on Facebook give rise to a more coherent depiction of personal 
ties in real-world networks than was previously possible through 
other means. 
Secondly, performing network clustering on an egocentric 
network has the potential to recognize unique features of that 
network which may not be present in other users’ networks.  
Clusters/groups do not have to follow general rules (e.g. everyone 
must have a group of “Friends” and a group of “Work 
Colleagues”, a certain number of groups, or groups of a particular 
size).  Instead, the groups created are exclusive to the individual 
user. 
Finally, network clustering appears to capture groups that are 
formed analogously to several of the 6 criteria that we have 
identified.  Social circles and cliques can readily be derived by 
algorithmic analysis of the network structure [3, 13].  The 
persistence of ties within the network also allows users’ network 
graphs to evolve over time, reflecting a personal history of 
relationships.  Clusters of ties are likely to form as people 
transition between temporal episodes, distinct geographical 
locations and organizational boundaries and build new sets of 
relationships.  Such clusters will also be identifiable 
algorithmically in the network structure. 
4.1 The SCAN Clustering Algorithm 
We used the SCAN algorithm [21] to cluster vertices (i.e. people) 
within each participant’s egocentric social network (see Fig 1b) 
into groups.  This algorithm also detects and isolates two kinds of 
vertex that play distinctive roles: ‘hubs’ that bridge clusters and 
‘outliers’ that are marginally connected to a cluster.  We observed 
in the card sorting exercise that participants struggled to place 
some contacts into groups because they were either weakly 
associated with a group (outliers) or strongly associated with 
multiple groups (hubs). 
Hubs are likely to represent people who belong to multiple social 
circles within the network.  Consider the example of a work 
colleague who is also a friend of the family.  Modularity based 
algorithms such as CNM [4], which consider only direct 
connections between contacts, are likely to place this person into 
either a cluster of work colleagues or a cluster of family members, 
depending on which cluster she has most connections to.  
However, from a human perspective a work colleague who is also 
a friend of the family may be viewed differently from other work 
colleagues who are not.  She may be treated differently in terms of 
the access she is granted to personal information and content.  For 
example, being a family friend could justify giving this person 
access to a certain piece of content.  Alternatively, she might be 
placed in groups with more restricted access to some personal 
content in order to prevent the dissemination of information from 
one cluster to another through her bridging effect. 
The SCAN algorithm uses the neighborhood of each vertex as an 
additional clustering criterion.  Vertices are grouped based on how 
they share neighbors.  Thus, hubs and outliers are detected 
because they differ in terms of structure and connectivity from the 
vertices around them.  Figure 2 shows an example of one 
participant’s egocentric network clustered using the SCAN 
algorithm. 
 
Figure 2. SCAN clustering output for a participant’s 
egocentric network showing clusters, hubs and outliers. 
4.2 Comparison of Algorithmic and Human 
Grouping 
We compared the output of the SCAN clustering algorithm with 
the output of the card-sorting exercise in which our participants 
grouped their own social network.  Our implementation of the 
SCAN algorithm performed clustering with ε values from 0.1 to 
0.9 (the threshold for determining whether vertices share enough 
neighbors to be clustered together) and selected the clustering 
output with the highest modularity value.  In order to see how 
closely the output of the SCAN algorithm matched the groups 
produced by each participant we used a formula designed to 
measure the similarity between two clusterings of the same dataset 
[20].  Let C = {C1, C2, …, Cm} be the set of clusters produced by 
the clustering algorithm and G = {G1, G2, …, Gn} be the set of 
groups produced by the participant in the card sorting exercise.  
The similarity Sij of a cluster Ci and group Gj is p, the number of 
contacts common to both groups (Ci ∩ Gj), divided by q, the total 
number of unique contacts in both groups (Ci ∪ Gj).  The overall 
similarity of a clustering C and grouping G uses all pair-wise 
comparisons of clusters and groups and is defined as: 
Sim(C, G) =Σi ≤ m, j ≤ n Sij / max(m, n) 
Table 3 shows the similarity of groups produced by our 
participants with algorithmically produced clusters.  A value of 1 
represents an identical output and 0 represents an output in which 
none of the contacts were grouped similarly.  The modularity of 
the network clustering using SCAN is also shown. 
On average, the SCAN algorithm produced clustering outputs that 
were 44.8% similar to the groups created by participants using the 
card sorting, with a range from 18.1 to 79.5%.  Although this 
value is by no means high enough for the clustering method to be 
 
used to automate groups within a social networking service, it 
corroborates that the presence of social circles and cliques within 
the network structure is a significant factor when manually 
organizing contacts into groups.  Using only data relating to the 
structure of the network approximately half of a user’s contacts 
can be placed into what the user considers suitable groups for 
controlling privacy.  However, this may not reduce the burden on 
users in grouping their contacts, as they would incur the extra cost 
of having to identify and adjust contacts that are incorrectly 
grouped.  
Table 3. Clustering Modularity and Similarity Values 
PARTICIPANT SCAN 
CLUSTERING 
MODULARITY 
SIMILARITY 
BETWEEN 
HUMAN & 
ALGORITHMIC 
CLUSTERING 
SIMILARITY 
(AFTER 
MERGING 
STRONG & 
WEAK TIE 
CARD GROUPS) 
1 .4032 .4100 .7454 
2 .7102 .5222 .6788 
3 .1625 .2849 -  
4 .5783 .4111 .6166 
5 .6085 .4812 .5922 
6 .3679 .4416 .6071 
7 .6877 .4374 .5383 
8 .1810 .3085 .6282 
9 .4562 .5804 -  
10 .0220 .1919 -  
11 .4842 .4411 -  
12 .6861 .5777 -  
13 .7952 .8004 .8892 
14 .3417 .3979 .6719 
15 .3730 .4384 .7306 
MEAN 0.4572 0.4483 0.6698 
4.2.1 Tie Strength Divisions 
Within our data we observed that single clusters produced by the 
algorithm were often similar to the combination of two groups 
produced by the human.  For example, Cluster 14 of Participant 
1’s network was 45% similar to the group that he had created and 
called ‘DeMontfort Friends’, and 37% similar to his group called 
‘Close DeMontfort Friends’.  In order to produce an algorithmic 
clustering output that was more similar to the human output, the 
algorithm would have needed to divide Cluster 14 into two 
corresponding clusters, however, the names of each group and the 
participant’s expressed rationale for creating them suggest that 
knowing how to perform this division relies not on analysis of the 
network structure but on consideration of tie strength within a 
cluster.  The only distinction between members of the two groups 
is their ‘closeness’ to the participant. 
Our card sorting and interview data allowed us to identify where 
users had overtly created a single group and then divided it with a 
consideration for weak and strong ties.  In cases for which we had 
documented evidence of this behavior (10 out of 15 participants) 
we were able to reconstruct the original, undivided group and re-
calculate the similarity measures to show the effect of tie strength.  
The final column in Table 3 shows the re-calculated similarity 
values where applicable.  The mean average similarity for these 
participants was 0.6698, suggesting that distinguishing between 
weak and strong ties in the automation process could improve the 
similarity between its output and the groups created by 
participants.  A paired t-test revealed that this improvement in 
similarity was statistically significant. (t = 6.8917, 9 d.f., p < 
0.01). 
Tie strength data for every connection between a user and her 
contacts would be required in order to augment the network 
clustering algorithm to split groups according to tie strength.  The 
work of Gilbert et al. [8] suggests that such a process could use an 
analysis of the interactions between members of a social network 
to derive the strength of ties, however we were unable to capture 
sufficient data about these interactions to replicate such a model 
within our study. 
4.2.2 Analysis of SCAN Algorithm Output 
We found that the detection of ‘hub’ and ‘outlier’ vertices 
provided some additional value.  When interviewing participants 
about how they had carried out the card sorting exercise, we asked 
them to identify any particular contacts that they had difficulty 
placing into a group.  We investigated how the SCAN algorithm 
had dealt with these contacts, 16 in total from all participants.  
Nine of the 16 were identified as hubs and a further 3 were 
identified as outliers.  Thus, hubs and outliers identified by SCAN 
represented 75% of the problematic contacts.  In an automated 
grouping service the algorithm could, for example, flag them and 
prompt the user to deal with them manually. 
Within many of the participants’ social networks there were 
vertices that were disconnected from any of the participant’s other 
contacts.  We found that for 7 of the participants the set of isolated 
vertices closely matched (>75%) a group of contacts that they had 
created during the card sorting exercise.  These were typically the 
groups that participants had created for weak ties, with labels such 
as ‘People I barely know’, ‘Who are these people?’ and ‘People I 
met online’.  If a person has no mutual friends with one of her 
contacts, i.e. that contact is a disconnected vertex in the network, 
that contact may not be well known to the user.  The similarity of 
the disconnected vertices detected by the clustering algorithm with 
weak-tie groups created by the participants suggests that people 
may often group such contacts together. 
As well as being unable to divide single clusters based on a 
division in tie strength, we also noticed that in some cases the 
clustering algorithm produced clusters which, had they been 
merged, would have been more similar to participant created 
groups.  Contacts that a participant perceived as a single group, for 
example “My Girlfriend’s Friends”, often consisted of multiple 
distinct cliques. The distinction between cliques may be more 
apparent to the members of the group, however it is unimportant 
to the participant for the purpose of controlling his privacy.  
Merging clusters would produce a single cluster that is more 
similar to the group created by the participant, however, any 
algorithm that works solely on network structure cannot know 
which groups to merge.  A guess could be made based on the 
connectedness of clusters but it would be prudent to allow user 
intervention before performing such merging. 
This feature was observable in the comparison of human and 
algorithmic outputs for many participants’ networks, particularly 
those with a low modularity value.  By definition, low modularity 
tells us that there are clusters which are distinct but which still 
have many edges between them.  An analysis using Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient indicated a statistically significant linear 
relationship between network modularity (as measured by the 
SCAN algorithm) and the similarity between human and 
algorithmic clustering, r(15) = 0.837, p<0.01.  That is, the more 
highly modularized a network, the more the algorithm’s clusters  
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Figure 3 a. Modularity vs Similarity graph; b. Comparing 
number of groups produced by algorithm and card sort. 
are similar to the groups produced by the human (see Fig 3a).  A 
possible explanation is that people who have clearly distinct social 
circles and cliques in their social network structure are more 
inclined to use this as a criterion for grouping their contacts.  
Networks with less distinct social circles and cliques produce 
algorithmic clusters that are dissimilar to those produced by 
humans.  In these circumstances, participants may rely on other 
criteria for grouping, e.g. tie strength.  The networks of 
participants 3 and 10 have the two lowest modularity values and 
these were the only participants not to consider cliques and social 
circles when manually organizing their contacts into groups (see 
Table 2). 
We found no significant effect of network size (number of 
contacts) on either the modularity or the similarity of the 
algorithmic and human clustering.  This suggests that the approach 
of identifying distinct groups using network clustering will scale 
from small to large networks.  There may be an upper or lower 
threshold at which the method becomes less effective but we did 
not find this within our range of 99 to 312 contacts. 
An analysis using Pearson’s correlation coefficient indicated a 
statistically significant linear relationship between network size 
and the number of groups created by participants, r(15) = 0.8308, 
p<0.01.  That is, participants with more Friends created more 
groups within which to place them.  Similarly, Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient indicated a statistically significant linear 
relationship between network size and the number of clusters 
found by the SCAN algorithm, r(15) = 0.6542, p<0.01.  This 
suggests that as people’s networks increase in size they do not 
merely increase the size of the social groups that already exist but 
also add new social groups to their network. 
5. INDIVIDUAL VS. GROUP PRIVACY  
Our final phase of data collection consisted of a questionnaire 
integrated into a Facebook application that was presented to our 
participants approximately 3 weeks after the interview and card 
sorting session.  Participants were asked to select a single item of 
information or content from any part of their Facebook profile 
which they either a) had shared but not with all of their contacts, 
b) had shared with all of their contacts but had actually wanted to 
share with only a subset of their contacts, or c) had not shared on 
Facebook because they did not want certain contacts to have 
access to it. 
Participants were then presented with a list of 100 of their 
Facebook contacts in a randomized order (99 in the case of the 
participant with fewer than 100 contacts).  These contacts were a 
stratified sample from the groups created in the card sorting 
exercise, although this was not explained to them.  They were 
asked to use a sliding scale to indicate their level of ‘willingness-
to-share’ the particular item of content that they had selected with 
each of these contacts.  The scale ranged from ‘Not at all willing’ 
to ‘Very willing’ and was initially set at a central, neutral position.  
Two of the participants were unavailable to complete the 
questionnaire.  The remaining 13 provided complete responses for 
all 1299 of the sampled contacts from their respective networks. 
Thus, we could analyse the groups created by the humans and by 
the SCAN algorithm for uniformity in the willingness-to-share 
values of their members for content taken from a range of 
contextualized information sharing situations.  By contextualized, 
we mean that they are not hypothetical or generalised but specific 
instances with known context. 
Since participants had been asked to group their contacts before 
focusing their attention on a specific item of content, these groups 
were intended for generic information sharing management; 
participants created groups they considered would be useful in a 
range of sharing situations.  Such groups could be inappropriate 
for managing the sharing of particular content with a given contact 
given that privacy related decisions may vary depending on 
contextual factors specific to an individual.  We cannot test the 
efficacy of groups against all conceivable content sharing 
contexts.  However, if willingness-to-share values are uniform 
within groups for a range of content sharing instances that 
participants have identified as being privacy sensitive, we can 
make a case for grouping as a viable approach to reducing the 
burden of privacy management. 
We also examined the properties of contacts whose willingness-to-
share values differed markedly from the rest of their group.  If 
willingness-to-share values are not uniform within groups, we can 
investigate whether the contacts whose values are outliers within 
the group exhibit any particular structural properties within the 
network that might help to identify them.  They could then be 
excluded from the group for particular information sharing 
purposes. 
5.1 Selected Content Items 
Our participants selected items from a wide range of content and 
information on which to base their responses.  These were: home 
addresses, contact details such as phone numbers or email 
addresses, specific status updates relating to their work life, 
organizational details about private events, messages containing 
secrets or sensitive information and particular photographs taken 
on holiday or while out partying.  Participants were asked to pick 
specific instances of content or information rather than a particular 
type of content, e.g. status updates or photographs, in order to 
avoid generalization or responses to hypothetical situations. 
One participant was unable to find an example of content that he 
had been unwilling to share uniformly with all of his contacts and 
therefore did not complete the questionnaire in full.  Two 
completed the questionnaire but gave entirely uniform 
willingness-to-share values for all contacts in the sample.  When 
we questioned these participants about their responses, they told 
us that they were willing to share the selected items with their 
entire network except for one particular individual.  In both cases 
this individual had not been included in our sample population. 
 
5.2 Individual vs. Group Privacy Results 
The bar chart shown in Figure 4 exemplifies the data collected.  A 
single chart corresponds to the data from a single participant 
sharing a particular item with their contacts.  Each bar in the chart 
represents the willingness-to-share value assigned to a particular 
contact.  Contacts are ordered according to the group to which 
they were assigned.  Each shaded region delimits a group.  The y-
axis ranges from -50, representing ‘Not at all willing’, to +50, 
representing ‘Very willing’.  
 
Figure 4. Example willingness-to-share data for a single 
participant sharing a single item of information/content 
We used these data to help answer the following questions: are the 
groups that participants have created accurate and useful for 
sharing content; are the groups created by the algorithm more or 
less useful than those created by the participant; to what extent 
does information leakage or undesirable sharing occur; and can the 
structural properties of the network provide any insight into when 
and why this happens? 
We measured the extent to which undesirable sharing outcomes 
occurred when privacy preferences were specified at the group 
level.  We define an undesirable outcome as the user either 
unwillingly sharing an item with a contact or unwillingly denying 
a contact access to an item.  A group can be used either to grant or 
deny access to the item for all the group members.  An undesirable 
outcome can therefore occur when an individual contact’s 
willingness-to-share value conflicts with the decision to grant or 
deny access to their group. 
Since willingness-to-share values were denoted on a sliding scale, 
we began by creating a bipolar classification of values as either 
‘Yes’ or ‘No’ decisions to grant access to the item to that 
individual contact.  This approach oversimplifies privacy related 
decisions to some extent, and assumes that there is no margin of 
neutrality within which users are unconcerned about the effects of 
sharing their content.  However, it serves to indicate the extent to 
which conflict occurs within groups, if we assume that sharing 
when only slightly unwilling to share and denying access when 
slightly willing to share are undesirable outcomes.  
If users of group-based access controls grant or deny access to a 
group within which there is a conflict, they may not necessarily 
choose the option that minimizes the number of undesirable 
outcomes.  For this reason, we consider best and worst case 
scenarios.  We define best case as the lowest number of contacts 
which contravene the overall group decision and worst case as the 
highest number of contacts which contravene the overall group 
decision.  For example, consider a group of 5 contacts within 
which you would share content with 4 and not with the remaining 
1.  The worst case scenario is that you choose not to share with the 
group, denying access to 4 contacts that you wish to share with.  
The best case scenario is that you grant access to the group but 
therefore grant access to 1 contact you did not wish to share with.  
By simplifying our model of privacy-related decisions, we assume 
that inadvertently granting and denying access are both equally 
undesirable.  In reality, of course, the consequences of unwillingly 
granting access to one individual may outweigh the benefits of 
sharing with the others.  However, despite its limitations, this 
model enables us to approximate the efficacy of group-based 
privacy control. 
The following sections report the extent to which information 
leakage and over-restriction occurred within the groups.  This 
analysis was performed for groups created both by participants 
and by the algorithm.  We were interested in determining whether 
groups created by participants explicitly, but generically for 
privacy control are sufficiently useful and whether it is worthwhile 
striving to automate their creation.  We also wish to test how 
useful the algorithm is in its current form, which considers only 
structural network clusters. 
5.2.1 Best and Worst Cases 
For the groups created by humans, the average worst case scenario 
across all participants is that 22.2% of contacts are either 
undesirably given or denied access when permissions are set at 
group level (M=0.222, SD=0.036).  In other words, 77.8% of 
contacts are correctly granted or denied access. 
The average best case scenario across all participants is that 9.2% 
of contacts are either undesirably granted or denied access 
(M=0.092. SD=0.025), meaning that 90.8% of individual contacts 
are correctly granted or denied access when permissions are set at 
group level. 
For groups determined by the algorithm rather than by humans, 
the average worst case scenario across all participants is that 
61.7% of contacts are either undesirably granted or denied access 
(M=0.617, SD=0.094), meaning that 38.3% of individual contacts 
are correctly granted or denied access when permissions are set at 
group level. 
The average best case scenario across all participants is that 23.9% 
of contacts are either undesirably granted or denied access 
(M=0.239, SD=0.081), meaning that 76.1% of individual contacts 
are correctly granted or denied access when permissions are set at 
group level. 
5.2.2 Improving the Model of Privacy Decisions 
The values in Section 5.2.1 represent a baseline measure of how 
well the groups perform as mediators of privacy preferences.  
Modeling indifference/neutrality to sharing particular content is 
only likely to improve this performance.  For illustrative purposes 
we created a margin of ‘Neutral’ values (-16.6 to +16.6 i.e. the 
central third of the slider scale) such that low positive and negative 
values were classified as ‘Neutral’.  By restricting ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ 
decisions to values that are more polarized to either end of the 
willingness-to-share scale, we restrict undesirable outcomes to 
those that are likely to have higher cost, e.g. a conflict in which a 
participant is ‘Very willing’ to share with one contact and ‘Very 
unwilling’ to share with another contact in the same group. 
In reality the boundaries between neutrality and choosing to share 
or restrict access to content are far more fuzzy and subject to 
individual variability between participants as well as the specifics 
of the content and its surrounding context. 
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When neutrality is considered, for the human-created groups the 
average worst case scenario is that 5.7% of contacts are 
undesirably granted or denied access (M=0.057, SD=0.019), 
meaning that 94.3% of individual contacts are correctly granted or 
denied access when permissions are set at group level. The 
average best case scenario is that 1.9% of contacts are undesirably 
granted or denied access (M=0.019, SD=0.012), meaning that 
98.1% of individual contacts are correctly granted or denied 
access when permissions are set at group level. 
For the algorithmically created groups, the average worst case 
scenario is that 42.4% of contacts are undesirably granted or 
denied access (M=0.424, SD=0.145), meaning that 57.6% of 
individual contacts are correctly granted or denied access when 
permissions are set at group level.  The average best case scenario 
is that 13.2% of contacts are undesirably granted or denied access 
(M=0.132, SD=0.048), meaning that 86.8% of individual contacts 
are correctly granted or denied access when permissions are set at 
group level. 
5.2.3 Network Properties vs. Group Uniformity 
We analyzed the data to determine whether the number of 
undesirable outcomes was correlated with factors such as the size 
and modularity of the network and number of groups created.  We 
also hypothesized that participants with coarse-grained groups 
would experience more information leakage and over-restriction, 
due to their not separating their contacts with sufficient granularity 
to manage their privacy settings effectively. 
Tests of Pearson’s correlation revealed no significant relationship 
between the number of undesirable outcomes and network size; 
r(10)=0.0464, p>0.05 n.s., number of groups; r(10)=0.3042, 
p>0.05 n.s. or modularity; r(10)=0.3769, p>0.05 n.s.  There is no 
evidence to suggest that participants are better positioned to create 
more useful groups for controlling privacy if they have networks 
of a particular size or modularity, or if they create more or fewer 
groups.  However, our hypothesis with respect to granularity 
holds.  Participants creating groups with a higher group to contact 
ratio (i.e. finer granularity) had fewer undesirable outcomes when 
sharing content with groups, r(10)=0.6355, p<0.05. 
5.2.4 Privacy Settings for Hubs and Outliers 
We noted in Section 4.2.2 that hubs and outliers accounted for 
75% of the contacts that participants struggled to assign to groups.  
We hypothesized that hubs and outliers might also give 
participants difficulty with content sharing decisions, either 
because of their ability to bridge multiple groups or their weak 
association with a particular group.  By using the SCAN algorithm 
we were able to identify these structural hubs and outliers, 
allowing us to test for a correlation between contacts whose 
willingness-to-share values were numerically distant from the rest 
of their group and the structural network properties of these 
anomalous contacts.  We identified all contacts for whom 
willingness-to-share values were more than 2 standard deviations 
from the group mean and noted whether they had been classified 
as group members, hubs or outliers by the SCAN algorithm.  
An unpaired t-test showed a significantly larger percentage of 
outliers within the set of contacts whose willingness-to-share 
values are more than 2SD from the group mean (M=0.337, 
SD=0.331) than outliers within the entire network (M=0.069, 
SD=0.059), (t = 2.3893, 18 d.f., p < 0.05).  That is, on average 
fewer than 7% of contacts throughout a network were structural 
outliers, but amongst contacts whose willingness-to-share values 
were not uniform with the rest of their group, over a third were 
structural outliers. 
Identifying outliers to the user could act as a useful “just-in-time” 
feature, helping to prevent undesirable outcomes when sharing 
information and content with a group of contacts.  We found that 
removing algorithmically identified outliers from the human-
created groups improved the accuracy of the groups, with between 
84.4% (worst case) and 94.7% (best case) of contacts being 
correctly granted or denied access [cf. Section 5.2.1.] 
An unpaired t-test comparing the percentage of hubs within the set 
of contacts whose willingness-to-share values were more than 
2SD from the group mean (M=0.044, SD=0.133) and hubs in the 
entire network (M=0.027, SD=0.039) revealed no significant 
difference (t=0.384, 18 d.f., ns).  The contrast between this finding 
and the corresponding significant finding for outliers may imply 
that our participants were less concerned about the effect of 
sharing with contacts who bridge multiple network clusters than 
sharing with contacts who are weakly associated with a cluster. 
6. DISCUSSION 
The results from our interviews suggested that participants were 
generally unwilling to organize their contacts into groups on 
Facebook because of the significant burden it placed on them.  A 
few users were motivated to create groups only when they could 
also be used for a number of other purposes, such as organizing 
chat lists, sending group messages and filtering content received 
from groups.  This finding suggests that working towards systems 
that reduce users’ configuration burden by automating the 
formation of groups is potentially valuable. 
Our participants were positive about the possibility of having an 
automated method for grouping contacts.  While they were aware 
that it could be far less time consuming, they also noted that the 
groups would have to be both meaningful and complete in order to 
be useful.  Facebook’s previous attempt to automate the creation 
of groups of contacts did not adequately meet the needs of its 
users for two reasons: groups were often incomplete and the 
mechanism for grouping did not reflect the criteria that users 
commonly consider when grouping their contacts. 
Through our card sorting exercise we uncovered six criteria that 
users considered when manually sorting contacts into groups for 
controlling privacy: social circles and cliques, tie strength, 
temporal episodes, geographical locations, functional roles, and 
organizational boundaries.  These corroborate prior findings and 
validate prior contextual analyses of copresent privacy practices in 
social network sites.  Skeels and Grudin [19] found that the 
multiplicity of groups on Facebook is both temporal, bringing 
together groups from different stages of the individual’s life, and 
spatial, bringing together people who might live in different 
geographical locations.  We corroborate these findings and show 
that users are also concerned about the coexistence of groups that 
vary in tie strength, span organizational boundaries and have 
different functional roles. 
Our findings convince us of the pitfalls of striving for 100% 
automation, for several reasons.  We found that different people 
considered different grouping criteria to varying degrees.  Basing 
our grouping algorithm on analysis of egocentric networks allows 
for individualized outputs that incorporate unique features of a 
user’s network.  However, in order to better account for this 
individual variability users may need to specify which criteria the 
algorithm should account for.   
 
While one might not expect a single, off-the-shelf algorithm to 
produce accurate groups for such a complex task, we have shown 
that the SCAN algorithm can go some way towards identifying 
groups that the user considers useful for controlling privacy.  We 
do not wish to paint these results in too positive a light and we 
highlight the need for improvement by more accurately emulating 
the grouping process of humans.  We have shown that a 
significant improvement over structural network clustering can be 
achieved by the additional consideration of tie strength.  On 
average, for participants who created groups using criteria 
analogous to network clustering and then divided groups based on 
tie strength, 66.9% of contacts could be accurately grouped using 
automation.  Some participants felt that they required particular 
groups to be divided into subgroups of strong and weak ties, 
whereas others did not.  An algorithm with a model of tie strength 
might be able to automatically divide clusters into groups of 
strong and weak ties, however, it would not know which clusters 
the user would like to divide in this way.  This illustrates the need 
for user intervention at certain points of the automation process to 
make decisions based on information unavailable to the machine 
and to ensure that control ultimately lies with the user.   
We established that there is a significant linear relationship 
between the modularity of our participants’ networks and the 
similarity of the groups created by humans and by the algorithm.  
Our results suggest that network modularity influences whether 
users consider the formation of network clusters when grouping 
contacts.  The participants with the lowest network modularity did 
not consider the criterion that is most strongly associated with 
network clusters, social circles and cliques, and instead based their 
grouping entirely on other factors such as tie strength. 
Research by both boyd [3] and Fisher [7] has demonstrated that 
people are very good at reading and interpreting their own social 
graph.  Our findings suggest that users may also have a basic 
awareness of the modularity of their own social graph when 
considering how to group contacts.  Participants with clear, 
distinct network clusters tend to group their contacts such that 
these clusters are reflected in their groups.  Those who are unable 
to separate clusters easily instead resort to grouping using other 
criteria.  Network clustering as an automated approach to group 
creation for privacy control is therefore most feasible for 
participants with high network modularity. 
We also found that participants had difficulty grouping particular 
contacts during the card sorting exercise, either because they had a 
weak association with the created groups or they had strong 
associations with multiple groups.  We found that the majority of 
problematic contacts were identified as hubs or outliers by the 
SCAN algorithm.  This implies that our participants are somewhat 
aware of a contact’s structural relationship with clusters in their 
network.  When analyzing social network structure, we 
recommend using clustering algorithms such as SCAN that 
identify hubs and outliers within the network.  While an automated 
approach to group creation would not be able to group these 
contacts reliably, it could at least recognize which contacts it 
should flag for the user to deal with, either when groups are 
initially created or when content is shared. 
Our analysis of participants’ willingness to share specific, privacy 
sensitive items of information/content with individuals from their 
network revealed that the detection of outlier vertices could also 
be advantageous.  The concentration of structural outliers within 
the set of contacts whose willingness-to-share values were more 
than 2SDs from their group’s mean was significantly higher than 
their presence in the network as a whole.  The same was not true 
for hubs, who had willingness-to-share values relatively uniform 
to the rest of their respective groups. 
We attempted to establish whether the relatively static approach of 
creating groups to which privacy settings could be applied is 
feasible for accurately controlling the disclosure of information, 
given the dynamic nature of privacy.  Lederer [15] finds that 
context is a secondary consideration, after the identity of the 
recipient.  This suggests that groups based on the identities of 
contacts (i.e. the social circle to which they belong, strength of tie 
to the user, geographical location, organization etc) may at least 
provide a suitable default group substructure, to which 
adjustments can be made in a range of contextualized content 
sharing situations.  Our analysis revealed that on average groups 
from the card sorting exercise resulted in between 77.8 and 90.8% 
of all contacts being assigned correct privacy settings when the 
settings were assigned at group level.  We also demonstrated that 
this is likely to increase if we are able to account for a margin of 
neutrality in which users are unconcerned about the effects of 
sharing, however, more work is needed to understand the variance 
attributable to privacy intentions.  There is also a substantial 
improvement if outliers are removed from groups altogether.  
Groups formed by the algorithm did not perform as well, with 
between 33.8 and 76.1% of contacts receiving the correct privacy 
settings.  Full tie strength information for each of the contacts 
could allow an augmented algorithm to produce groups more 
similar to the card sorted groups and therefore improve their 
accuracy.   
Although the groups that participants created could be used to 
provide accurate privacy settings for a fairly high percentage of 
contacts in a range of cases, there is still the possibility that a 
single unwanted recipient of sensitive content may nullify the 
benefits of the group-based approach.  Allowing the user to easily 
adjust these groups and verify that they accurately reflect their 
privacy intentions is a problem that requires more attention. 
7. CONCLUSION 
This work takes a step towards providing group-based privacy 
controls for social networks that take account of how users 
naturally organize groups and which reduce the configuration 
burden for the user.  We have uncovered six criteria that people 
consider when organizing their social network contacts into 
groups for the purpose of controlling privacy.  We have also 
demonstrated that automated approaches which account for these 
criteria, such as detecting cliques within a social network and 
separating weak and strong ties, have the potential to reduce the 
burden of organizing contacts for social network users.  Although 
our algorithm does not produce entirely accurate groups, this work 
is a valuable contribution to the debate about an emergent privacy 
related challenge.  In the course of implementing and testing the 
SCAN algorithm we found that the detection of outliers within the 
network has strong potential to offer a real advantage in 
identifying potentially problematic contacts when using group-
based sharing in a social network.  Designers who wish to improve 
burdensome privacy controls could consider an automated 
approach to grouping contacts with the criteria we have identified.  
In our ongoing work we aim to investigate how automated tools 
might consider all six of these criteria.  
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